Political liberalism for post-islamist, muslim-majority societies by Badamchi, Meysam
Article
Political liberalism
for post-Islamist,
Muslim-majority societies
Meysam Badamchi
Istanbul S¸ehir University, Istanbul, Turkey
Abstract
This article tries to develop a moderate reading of political liberalism applicable to post-Islamist,
Muslim-majority societies. Contrary to the strong reading, which considers political liberalism as
limited in its scope to those societies that already have a strong liberal tradition, I argue that Rawls’
project does have something to offer to reasonable post-Islamist, Muslim individuals. In part I of
the article the idea of a post-Islamist, Muslim-majority society is conceptualized and explained. Part
II focuses on the Rawlsian ideas of justification, demonstrating that the conceptions of justification
available in political liberalism, i.e. political constructivism, wide reflective equilibrium and a wide
view of public reasoning with its ideas of declaration and conjecture, can justify the political con-
ception of justice for reasonable individuals living in any society, including post-Islamist ones.
Focusing on Rawls’ notions of stability in part III, I argue that the idea of overlapping consensus
should not be considered as the only account of stability offered by political liberalism. Put another
way, notwithstanding the strong reading of political liberalism in real western and post-Islamist
democracies, liberal stability is always a mixture of overlapping consensus and modus vivendi.
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In the last two decades, a substantial body of scholarly literature has emerged on the rela-
tionship between Islam and democracy, produced by African, Middle Eastern, Asian,
European and North American scholars. However, most of these works are indifferent
to Rawls’ idea of Political Liberalism (1993) as one of the most recent accounts of liberal
political theory, and the small, though significant, body of literature which addresses
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Islam and the political liberalism issue limits the scope of its question to the case of
Muslims living in western liberal democracies, neglecting the case of Muslim-
majority societies of the Middle East and elsewhere.1
Furthermore, in the mainstream interpretation of political liberalism, which I call the
strong reading of political liberalism, Rawls’ project to defend liberal democracy is spe-
cially considered to be limited in its scope to non-Muslim societies, not providing any
type of justification for liberal institutions beyond the modern West. Thus, political lib-
eralism on a strong reading seems to offer nothing for aspiring democracies in the Middle
East and elsewhere. That is because apparently since A Theory of Justice (1999b[1971])
the range of social systems that Rawls takes his liberal conception of justice to be appli-
cable to has dramatically shrunk (Pogge, 1989: 213, n.).2 Especially Rawls’ distinction
between decent and liberal peoples in his theory of international relations as offered in
The Law of Peoples (1999a) is considered as a proposal for decent religious states for
Muslim-majority societies (Hadji Haidar, 2008: 104). A liberal Muslim’s reaction to
these shifts in Rawls’ theory might be articulated similarly to the following words:
In renouncing any universalistic ambitions Rawls may now seem to have gone too far in the
other direction and to have produced a version of liberalism that is so historically specific and
so dependent on a prior context of liberal institutions as to be of little relevance in those situa-
tionswhere the justification of liberalismmatters most: that is, where liberalism is confronted
by, and must engage with, societies whose practices are not liberal. (Scheffler, 1994: 21)
Rawls believes that people’s justifiable and reasonable faith in constitutional democracy
affects their thoughts about and attitudes towards actual politics and the way they con-
front non-democratic forces (Rawls, 1999a: 128). If that is the case, why should political
liberalism be regarded as being indifferent to the democratic transitions in the Middle
East? In this article, against the claims of the strong reading, I try to develop a moderate
reading of political liberalism applicable to Muslim-majority societies. However, the
subject of my discussion is not all the countries of the Muslim world. I have particularly
in mind those Muslim-majority societies that during the last two decades have been and
are experiencing a post-Islamist turn. Here I need to explain what I mean by a post-
Islamist, Muslim-majority society.
I What is a post-Islamist, Muslim-majority society?
In his account of the sociological and historical roots of political liberalism, Rawls
mainly mentions three factors: (1) the religious Reformation and its aftermath the Wars
of Religion; (2) the rise of the modern state and constitutionalism; and finally (3) the
development of modern natural sciences. The Reformation and the Wars of Religion
fragmented the unity of Christianity in the Middle Ages according to Rawls, and paved
the way for religious pluralisms, and by the end of the 18th century pluralism became a
fact in European culture. The rise of the modern state and its central administration
limited the absolute power of rulers to the principles of constitutionalism. And the devel-
opment of modern science by Copernicus, Newton and others led to the division of
power between the Church and the secular world (Rawls, 1996: xxii–xxvi). There are
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interesting similarities between these sociological milestones for political liberalism, and
what some scholars call the post-Islamist situation of some of the Muslim-majority soci-
eties. But before going to that, I need to make clear why a post-Islamist, Muslim-
majority society is different from Rawls’ idealized Islamic people named Kazanistan.
As mentioned earlier, Rawls’ model of decent hierarchical people, exemplified by the
case of imaginary Kazanistan in The Law of Peoples, may falsely inspire the assumption
that Rawls’ only normative proposal for contemporary Muslim-majority societies is to
be decent.3 Indeed, there are visible references to Islam in Rawls’ example of Kazani-
stan, where Kazanistan’s system of law ‘does not institute the separation of church and
state. Islam is the favored religion, and only Muslims can hold the upper positions of
political authority and influence the government’s main decisions and policies, including
foreign affairs’ (Rawls, 1999a: 75–6). Insofar as other religions are tolerated and may be
practised without fear or loss of most civic rights except the right to hold the higher polit-
ical or judicial offices, Kazanistan is considered as a decent society by Rawls. However,
he admits that there are fundamental differences between Kazanistan and a liberal dem-
ocratic society.4
Indeed, according to Will Kymlicka the idea of decent hierarchical people is adopted
upon the millet system of the Ottoman Empire with a non-liberal understanding of the
idea of toleration (Kymlicka, 1995: 156–8). The Ottoman Empire’s pre-modern, multi-
national system is not compatible with the models of post-colonial, Muslim-majority
nation-states which, following the 19th-century European models of the nation-state, are
almost based on a unitary and homogeneous political culture.5 None of the past multi-
cultural empires of the Islamic world resisted after the world wars of the 20th century.
Thus, Rawls’ picture of the Muslim people of Kazanistan is oversimplified and does not
fit with the real experience of most of the Muslim-majority nation-states. This is the case
particularly if we consider the post-Islamist experience of Muslim-majority countries
like Iran in the last decades. By Islamism I refer to ‘those ideologies and movements that
strive to establish some kind of an ‘‘Islamic order’’ – a religious state, shari‘a law, and
moral codes in Muslim societies and communities’ (Bayat, 2013: 4). Association with
the state is a key feature of Islamist politics. On the opposite side, what is called post-
Islamism is predominantly marked by a call to limit the political role of religion. A
post-Islamist society is not anti-religion, but rather reflects a tendency to resecularize
religion among a vast number of populations. The idea of an Islamic religious state is
no longer dominant among the public political culture of a post-Islamist society.
As originally used by Bayat for the first time in his 1996 article, post-Islamism had an
Iranian genealogy pertaining only to the realities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Accord-
ing to Mahdavi, the experience of post-revolutionary Iran both conceptualizes and con-
textualizes the conception of post-Islamism (Mahdavi, 2011). However, recent studies
demonstrate that in the last two decades Islamism has been transformed in many other
Muslim-majority societies as well. For example, one might consider Turkey. Dagi’s
study shows that in their transformation from Islamism to post-Islamism, post-Islamist
Muslim intellectuals in Turkey appear to have abandoned their ideas for the construction
of an alternative Islamic political order to replace modernity (Dagi, 2004).6
Post-Islamism represents both a condition and a project which might be exemplified
in a multi-dimensional movement. As a condition it refers to a political and social
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situation where ‘following a phase of experimentation, the appeal, energy, symbols and
sources of legitimacy of Islamism get exhausted, even among its once-ardent support-
ers’. This is a condition where Islamists become aware of their system’s anomalies and
inadequacies as they attempt to normalize and institutionalize their rule and become
compelled ‘both by their internal contradictions and by social pressure to reinvent them-
selves’ (Bayat, 2005: 5; cf. Bayat, 1996: 45–6).
Post-Islamism as a project is ‘a conscious attempt to conceptualize and strategize the
rationale and modalities transcending Islamism in social, political, and intellectual
domain’ (Bayat, 2005: 5). Post-Islamism as a project aims to marry Islam with individual
choice and freedom, with democracy and with modernity. It is a research program to
achievewhat some have named as alternativemodernity. It ‘implies an understanding that
not only is Islam compatible with modernity, but its very survival as a religion depends
upon achieving this compatibility’ (Bayat, 1996: 45–6). Thus, in a post-Islamist turn the
militant Islamism is replaced by trends towards universal human rights and the very idea of
democracy. A post-Islamist society experiences a ‘post-ideological’ situation as well,
where the age of ideological convictions in which all people were supposed and suggested
to believe in a particular comprehensive doctrine, either Islamism, Marxism, or any other
religious or secular conviction, is considered to be over (Dabashi, 2010: 53–68).
As far as a post-Islamist Muslim’s view on the idea of a secular state is concerned,
these lines by Sudanese Muslim intellectual Abdullahi An-Na‘im are very enlightening:
In order to be a Muslim by conviction and free choice, which is the only way one can be a
Muslim, I need a secular state. By a secular state I mean one that is neutral regarding reli-
gious doctrine, one that does not claim or pretend to enforce Sharia – the religious law of
Islam – simply because compliance with Sharia cannot be coerced by fear of state institu-
tions or faked to appease their officials. (An-Na‘im, 2008: 1)
An-Na‘im calls for the state, and not the society, to be secularized in order to ‘enhance
and promote genuine religious observance, to affirm, nurture, and regulate the role of
Islam in the public life of the community’. Thus, a post-Islamist Muslim like An-Na‘im
finds the idea of an Islamic state, i.e. the claim that the state needs coercively to enforce
the laws of shariah upon the society, as problematic both from a religious and a
philosophical-legal perspective.
At the beginning of this section I mentioned three factors as the sociological and his-
torical roots of political liberalism in Europe according to Rawls, i.e. religious reform,
establishment of the modern state and constitution, and the development of modern
sciences. Here I want to argue that among these historical and cultural preconditions
of political liberalism all are more or less predominant in a post-Islamic society. As men-
tioned above, at the heart of post-Islamism lies a serious movement for religious reform
and a rejection of the idea of a religious state. As far as the second and third requirements
are concerned, the post-Islamist countries like Iran are modern states with modern con-
stitutions – although not liberal ones – and since the beginning of the 20th century they
have established their own modern schools and universities which were absent before.
As a result, many concepts of modern natural sciences are now well entrenched in the
public culture of a post-Islamist, Muslim-majority society.
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So far I have explained the meaning of the term ‘post-Islamism’. Here the question is
whether Rawls’ theory of political liberalism has the potential to enrich post-Islamism’s
intellectual side or not. Considering this fundamental question of Rawls’ in his latest arti-
cle on public reason, I think political liberalism has the capacity to contribute well in the
intellectual project of post-Islamism. As Rawls puts it, political liberalism asks:
How is it possible for those holding religious doctrines, some based on religious authority,
for example, the Church or the Bible, to hold at the same time a reasonable political con-
ception that supports a reasonable constitutional democratic regime? Can these doctrines
still be compatible for the right reasons with a liberal political conception? . . .How is it pos-
sible for citizens of faith to be wholehearted members of a democratic society who endorse
society’s intrinsic political ideals and values and do not simply acquiesce in the balance of
political and social forces? (Rawls, 1997: 780–1)
I think this question is central to the post-Islamist project. In the rest of this article I try to
develop a moderate reading of political liberalism which can be extended to post-
Islamist, Muslim-majority countries. I think only a moderate, and not a strong, interpre-
tation of political liberalism can address post-Islamist societies.
Extending Rawls’ political liberalism to post-Islamist, Muslim-majority societies
In all of Rawls’ political philosophy works, starting from A Theory of Justice, through
Political Liberalism and ending in The Law of Peoples, the principles of justice are pre-
sented in two main stages. First, the most reasonable principles of justice – either for
domestic or international cases – are selected from among a list of rival principles, with-
out taking into account their possible stability. In the second stage, we check whether the
society regulated by the principles selected in the first stage is stable. These two stages of
the argument for justice are complementary to each other in the sense that, unless we are
able to show that the political conceptions selected in the first stage are sufficiently stable
at the second stage, the argument for justice is incomplete.
Following this logic our moderate interpretation of political liberalism is presented in
two sections. In the first part (section II of the article) I will argue that the methods of
justification available in political liberalism are more universal in their character in con-
trast to the claims of strong reading. Extending the conceptions of justification in polit-
ical liberalism into a post-Islamist, Muslim-majority context, I show that political
liberalism has enough justificatory tools to give reasonable individuals living in those
societies reasons in defense of liberal democratic institutions. My focus here will be
on Rawls’ accounts of political constructivism, wide reflective equilibrium and public
reasoning, where the latter one is accompanied by two complementary non-public dis-
courses named declaration and conjecture. As will be shown, the idea of the reasonable,
like a rope, links these different Rawlsian justificatory tools and the idea of post-
Islamism together.
Focusing on Rawls’ accounts of stability, in the second part of this section (section III
of the article) I consider whether the political conception of justice can be stable in a
post-Islamist, Muslim-majority context. I will argue that a full overlapping consensus
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is not available even in modern western societies, and in any democratic society includ-
ing post-Islamist ones liberal stability needs to be considered as a mixture of modus
vivendi (where citizens endorse principles of justice simply out of rational reasons) and
an overlapping consensus (where the endorsement of justice is rooted in reasonableness
of the citizens).
II Rawlsian conceptions of justification and universal inclusion
of the reasonable
1 Political constructivism
Political constructivism is a view about the content and structure of justice as fairness as
the most reasonable conception of justice. This procedure of construction is modeled by
the original position in which rational agents, as representatives of real individuals sub-
ject to the constraints of the veil of ignorance, select two principles of justice to regulate
the basic structure of their society. In political liberalism, the original position provides a
useful device to elaborate a political conception of justice for the basic structure from the
ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation and of persons regarded as free and equal
(Rawls, 1996: 26). Thus, the idea of the original position presumes particular concep-
tions of society and persons, and the conditions imposed on the parties along with the
description of their deliberations model the rationality and reasonableness of individuals.
Since Rawls regards free and equal persons as both rational – having a conception of the
good – and reasonable – owning a sense of justice – the original position ascribes to the
parties in it two corresponding higher-order interests in order to be able to develop and
exercise their moral powers of rationality and reasonableness. Someone who has not
developed and cannot exercise the two moral powers of reasonableness and rationality
to the minimum requisite degree cannot be a normal and fully cooperating member of
society over a complete life, and thus is not modeled in the original position (ibid.: 74).
Conceptions of society and the person have a significant place in political construc-
tivism as the particular Rawlsian method of justification. According to Rawls, the orig-
inal position as the procedure of construction demonstrates ‘how the principles of justice
follow from the principles of practical reason in union with conceptions of society and
person, themselves ideas of practical reason’ (Rawls, 1996: 90). Justice as fairness does
not proceed from practical reason alone, but is developed from the union of practical rea-
son with particular conceptions of society and person. The conceptions of person and
society exemplify agents who reason and characterize ‘the context for the problems . . . to
which practical reason applies’ (ibid.: 107). This account of practical reasoning which is
tied to political constructivism has strong universal elements, being able to be extended
to a post-Islamist context.
As Roberts puts it, ‘perhaps different conceptions of society and person will be appro-
priate in different contexts and for different subjects’ (Roberts, 2007: 64). Indeed, con-
trast between Political Liberalism and The Law of Peoples shows that different
conceptions of society and person lead to liberal or decent conceptions of justice in the
two different models of constructivism developed in these works (ibid.: 67–8). Regard-
ing liberal democracy, Rawls’ constructivism uses conceptions of society as a fair
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system of cooperation and of the person as a free and equal citizen. However, regarding a
decent society, which is Rawls’ concern in the second part of ‘Ideal Theory’ in The Law
of Peoples, persons are described differently.
For Rawls, decency is ‘a normative idea of the same kind as reasonableness, though
weaker . . . it covers less than reasonableness does’ (Rawls, 1999a: 67). His minimalist idea
of human rights is connected to his perception of the decent in that decency is the most
universalist normative conception in his political philosophy: ‘Definite [minimum] con-
ceptions of society and person are essential elements of any conception of justice’ (Rawls,
1996: 109–10). As mentioned earlier in the case of Kazanistan, lacking the democratic idea
of citizenship according to which one person has one vote, the decent conception of society
is ‘associationist’, viewing society as a hierarchical community, with persons being mem-
bers of that community rather than free and equal citizens (Rawls, 1999a: 64, 73).
In Political Liberalism Rawls famously claims that the content of the political con-
ception of justice
. . . is expressed in terms of certain fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political
culture of a democratic society . . .This public political culture compromises the political
institutions of a constitutional regime and the public traditions of their interpretation
(including those of the judiciary), as well as historic texts and documents that are common
knowledge. (Rawls, 1996: 13–14)
Indeed, the fundamental ideas implicit in the public political culture of advanced democ-
racies are different aspects of the idea of ‘society as a fair system of cooperation’ and the
idea of citizens ‘as free and equal persons’ (Rawls, 1996: 14).7
Here is the point. Opposite to the moderate reading of political liberalism which is
adopted in this article, the strong reading interprets the above phrase as meaning that
Rawls’ political liberalism addresses only individuals living in countries with a long lib-
eral democratic tradition, making it irrelevant in those contexts in which democracy is
going to be established for the first time. However, the moderate reading of political lib-
eralism appropriate for post-Islamist, Muslim-majority societies, interprets the above
famous lines as implying that only those individuals who hold reasonable comprehensive
doctrines, no matter in which society they live, are addressed by political liberalism. To
make this clearer, we need to look at the idea of reasonable in more detail.
For Rawls, reasonableness (together with rationality) is one of the fundamental pow-
ers of free and equal citizens in a well-ordered society. The first basic aspect of reason-
ableness is ‘the willingness to propose fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them
provided others do’. The second basic aspect, according to Rawls, is ‘the willingness
to recognize the burdens of judgment’ (Rawls, 1996: 43). Kelly and McPherson term
these ‘political reasonableness’ and ‘philosophical reasonableness’ respectively (Kelly
and McPherson, 2001). A reasonable person desires a social world in which all free and
equal citizens can cooperate with one another on terms all can endorse. Thus, the liberal
conceptions of both society and person, as explained earlier, are tied to Rawls’ idea of the
reasonable.8
According to political liberalism’s thesis for post-Islamist, Muslim-majority societ-
ies, instead of considering the reasonable as being rooted in the shared culture of western
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liberal societies, it is more appropriate to say that reasonableness is the shared political
culture of reasonable individuals all over the world. One may justify this position by
appealing to philosophers like Scanlon, who define reasonableness as the disposition
in which ‘when we address our minds to a question of right and wrong, what we are try-
ing to decide is, first and foremost, whether certain principles are ones that no one, if
suitably motivated, could reasonably reject’ (Scanlon, 1998: 190). It is very important
to note that the attitude which Scanlon attributes to the reasonable is universal, part of
the idea of practical reasoning.
Connected with the idea of reasonable is the concept of a reasonable comprehensive
doctrine; that is, a comprehensive doctrine affirmed by reasonable individuals in any
society (Rawls, 1996: 59). Likewise one might argue decent or unreasonable individuals
affirm decent or unreasonable comprehensive views respectively. Rawls defines a com-
prehensive doctrine as having three main features. First, it is an exercise of theoretical
reasoning, including conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal
virtue (ibid.: 175; cf. ibid.: 59). Second, it determines which values count as having more
weight when values conflict. Third, it normally belongs to, or is an extension of, a tra-
dition of thought with a specific history and intellectual movement. Rawls seems to
count all familiar traditional religious doctrines, such as Islam, as reasonable (or at least
decent) (ibid.: 59–60). Since the rational and the reasonable are embedded into, or mod-
eled by, the original position, a reasonable interpretation of Islam is embedded into, or
modeled by, political constructivism as well.
Conversely, unreasonable views of Islam are not modeled in political constructivism.
As far as decent Islamic and non-Islamic doctrines are concerned, although they are not
initially enrolled in the second original position described in The Law of Peoples, the
results of that second original position, leading to the international law of peoples, are
also acceptable to them.9
If political constructivism had modeled only individuals living in long-standing liberal
societies, it would have no justificatory force in a post-Islamist, Muslim-majority context.
However, since reasonable individuals living in post-Islamist societies are modeled by
political constructivism or embedded into it, they may find political constructivism persua-
sive. For the same reason, unreasonable doctrines belonging to unreasonable individuals
living in post-Islamist societies (both religious and secular) are excluded from political
constructivism. Thus, within a Muslim-majority society, depending on the comprehensive
views of the individual in question, he or she may regard justice as fairness as persuasive or
as unattractive. The justification of liberal institutions can be extended into a post-Islamist,
Muslim-majority context depending on the comprehensive doctrine of the person in ques-
tion. As an example of unreasonable religious doctrines which will not find political lib-
eralism as persuasive one might mention guardianship of the jurist doctrine [velayat-e
faqih], as the most influential manifest of Shia Islamism in the contemporary era.
2 Wide reflective equilibrium in post-Islamist, Muslim-majority societies
It can be claimed that whereas politician constructivism is the specific Rawlsian meth-
odology to justify the two principles of justice as fairness in a post-Islamist, Muslim-
majority context, wide reflective equilibrium is the general Rawlsian methodology to
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justify any political conception of justice in those societies and elsewhere. Indeed,
Rawls’ concept of wide reflective equilibrium implies his universalist understanding
of justification in political philosophy. According to Rawls, reflective equilibrium is a
process of moral deliberation in which we move back and forth between a judgement
about what is the right action in a particular case and the reasons that are offered for
it. In this process, we may revise what we regard as correct if our initial intuitions do not
fit with the principles we are later inclined to accept.
A reflective equilibrium can be narrow or wide. It is narrow when only a very limited
number of conceptions of justice is taken into account. Wide reflective equilibrium, on
the other hand, is reached when we carefully consider alternative conceptions of justice
in philosophical tradition and the force of various arguments for them. At the end of a
wide reflective equilibrium, the involved person has considered the leading conceptions
of political justice found in the western or eastern philosophical tradition, including
views critical of the concept of justice itself, and has weighed the force of the different
philosophical and other reasons for them (Rawls, 2001: 31; cf. Rawls, 1996: 384 n.).
Therefore, the difference between a narrow and a wide reflective equilibrium is that in
the former the person is presented only with conceptions of political justice which more
or less match her existing judgements except for minor differences, whereas in the latter
the deliberating person considers all possible conceptions of justice favoured by other
individuals in modern eastern or western societies, together with all relevant philosophi-
cal arguments for them (Rawls, 1996: 384 n.; cf. Rawls, 1999b[1971]: 49). In reaching a
wide reflective equilibrium, if we are not able to test our beliefs against all advanced
moral theories of various types, at least we do so in the case of some leading alternatives
(Daniels, 2003).
Indeed, wide reflective equilibrium is what many political philosophers, including
those who belong to the Muslim tradition, aim at when engaging in political philosophy.
According to Norman, wide reflective equilibrium is ‘Rawls’s most enduring legacy’ in
political philosophy, although nobody uses it as a literal method for political philoso-
phizing (Norman, 1998). That is, it is not how a post-Islamist political philosopher
argues on the written page because, by the time a theorist writes, he has already settled
on the considered judgements he will use to support his own refined theory or to refute
someone else’s.
Therefore, wide reflective equilibrium is a universalist method of justification that is
not limited to any particular society. A reasonable person who reflectively reads Rawls
or other texts on political philosophy in a post-Islamist, Muslim-majority society or else-
where is able to move back and forth between a particular theoretical framework, such as
the original position, and her firmer intuitions of justice, to reach a balance. That is,
involvement in the process of reaching a reflective equilibrium does not require living
in a long-standing western democracy. Similarly to the case of political constructivism,
a reasonable Muslim individual in post-Islamist society may benefit from this method to
support his society’s democratic institutions, or to justify establishing new ones in cases
where they do not already exist. On the other hand, unreasonable individuals such as fun-
damentalist Islamists will find these Rawlsian methods of justification neither persuasive
nor attractive. Opposite to post-Islamist persons, they will not regard wide reflective
equilibrium as a persuasive method of justification for justice.
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3 Public reasoning, declaration and conjecture
Public reason is the third Rawlsian method of justification offered in political liberalism.
It is the reason of free and equal citizens participating in public debates in their society.
Here again the idea of the reasonable has a central role in Rawls’ understanding of jus-
tification. For Rawls, given the reasonable pluralism in a democratic culture, the aim of
political liberalism is to uncover the conditions of the possibility of a reasonable public
basis to justify fundamental political principles. In so doing, political liberalism distin-
guishes the public point of view from the many non-public (though not private) points of
view (Rawls, 1996: xix). Public reason demonstrates the moral ideal of citizenship in a
democratic society.
Following from the idea of public reason, in a reasonable constitutional democracy,
the coercive power of the state, which citizens may impose over each other as members
of the public political forum or while voting, is legitimate only when they are able to
explain to each other the policies and principles they advocate and vote for in a language
which is compatible with the political values of public reason. Thus, public reason is tied
to the liberal principle of legitimacy, according to which ‘our exercise of political power
is proper and fully justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution
the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of
principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational’ (Rawls, 1996: 217).
Two accounts of public reasoning may be discerned in the works of Rawls. In the ear-
lier account, he adopted a more restrictive view of public reason, arguing that in a well-
ordered society citizens should avoid appealing to their comprehensive and non-public
reasons in public political debates, particularly when it comes to constitutional essentials
and matters of fundamental justice. However, he accepted that in a society where religion
has a significant role in public identity and is not fully well-ordered in a technical sense,
a reasonable religious discourse is permitted to enter into public discourse on condition
that this eventually leads to a situation where the limits of public reason are fully hon-
oured (Rawls, 1996: 249 f.). To quote Rawls, ‘for a well-ordered society to come about
in which public discussion consists in the appeal to political values, prior historical con-
ditions may require that comprehensive reasons be invoked to strengthen those values’
(ibid.: 251 n.). This situation is more likely to happen when there are just a few strongly
held comprehensive doctrines believed by the majority of citizens, similar to the situa-
tion of Muslim-majority societies. Thus, in a post-Islamist Muslim society where a
majority believes in Islam, reasonable Islamic arguments can have an important role
in strengthening the values of public reason in the political culture. Indeed, when, in a
particular moment of history, liberal institutions are going to be established for the first
time in a post-Islamist society, there is no way to escape from developing comprehensive
philosophical, moral, or religious justifications, in addition to purely political arguments,
in favour of liberalism. Viewed this way, Rawls’ initial idea of public reason can be
extended into a post-Islamist context.
This universalist characteristic of Rawls’ account of public reasoning becomes even
more obvious when we consider his latest account of public reason. In ‘The Idea of Pub-
lic Reason Revisited’ (1997) Rawls adopted a more inclusive view of public reason,
called by him ‘the wide view of public political culture’, arguing that both religious and
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non-religious comprehensive arguments are morally permissible in public discussions at
any time insofar as they satisfy a proviso. This proviso states that
. . . reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be introduced in
public political discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons
– and not reasons given solely by comprehensive doctrines – are presented that are sufficient
to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support. (Rawls,
1997: 784; emphasis added)
In addition to this shift, in his revisited account of public reasoning Rawls also intro-
duced two types of non-public justification, named ‘declaration’ and ‘conjecture’. Both
declaration and conjecture support the ideal of public reason, with the only difference
between them being their agents. These two discourses are very helpful in strengthening
liberal values in public political culture of a post-Islamist society. In a declaration, a rea-
sonable citizen declares how her own comprehensive doctrine endorses a political con-
ception consistently. We get involved in declaration to show ‘how, from our own
doctrines, we can and do endorse a reasonable public political conception of justice with
its principles and ideals’ (Rawls, 1997: 786; emphasis added). The aim of a declaration is
to assure others who affirm different reasonable comprehensive doctrines that we also
endorse a political conception belonging to the family of reasonable conceptions of jus-
tice. On the other hand in a conjecture, ‘we argue from what we believe, or conjecture,
are other people’s basic doctrines, religious or secular, and try to show them that, despite
what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political conception that can
provide a basis of public reasons’ (ibid.). Conjecture fails if it violates what may be
called the ethics of conjecture (March, 2009: 65–96).10 Through both declaration and con-
jecture, citizens holding different reasonable comprehensive views in a post-Islamist
society are reassured, and this reassurance strengthens the ties of civic friendship.11
Generally speaking, declaration seems to be more powerful than conjecture because
declaration is uttered by a believer from the same community, whereas conjecture is
developed by persons who are looking to that faith community from the outside
(although sympathetic with that faith).12 Consider the comprehensive doctrine of Islam.
While in declaration the agent is a reasonable faithful Muslim declaring that her compre-
hensive view endorses the political conception, in conjecture the subject will be a non-
Muslim (i.e. an atheist or a Christian) who is nevertheless highly respectful and sympa-
thetic towards Islam. An-Na‘im’s post-Islamist theory of shariah, as noted briefly earlier,
is a good example of a reasonable comprehensive doctrine which supports the political
values of public reason and constitutionalism (Rawls, 1997: 782–3 n.; cf. An-Na‘im,
1990, 2008).13 An-Na‘im clearly explains the logic of declaration from a post-Islamist
point of view: ‘it is important to strive to justify my proposal from an Islamic perspective
for Muslims, without denying the right of others to support the same position from their
respective religious or philosophical positions’ (An-Na‘im, 2008: 6).14
Although both declaration and conjecture are non-public types of reasoning, their role
in strengthening the idea of public reason becomes particularly clear when there is a con-
flict between the pro tanto justification of public reason and various citizens’ non-
political values (Schwartzman, 2012). A pro tanto justification is a type of justification
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that takes into account only political values while neglecting non-political ones (Rawls,
1996: 386). Therefore, in his latest account of public reason Rawls accepts that political
philosophers may advance non-political conceptions of justice where, and to the extent
that, this is necessary to refute those unreasonable comprehensive religious, moral, or
metaphysical conceptions that conflict with the political conception proposed by politi-
cal liberalism.15 It needs to be noted that declaration and conjecture are not limited to
religious discourse. A secular, non-public philosophical argument in favor of the polit-
ical conception can be an example of declaration or conjecture.16
Similar to political constructivism and wide reflective equilibrium, reasonableness
has a central role in Rawls’ account of public reasoning. Furthermore, political liberal-
ism seems to be unachievable unless a society, historically speaking, already has a strong
tradition of engagement in comprehensive liberalism, in which reasonable philosophical,
moral and religious arguments are proposed for the political conception of justice. One
can doubt that without prevalent reasonable religious arguments in favor of political con-
ception, political liberalism is able to justify establishment of the liberal institutions in
the first place in a post-Islamist Muslim society. In other words, post-Islamist societies
need to get engaged in comprehensive types of justification, i.e. declaration and conjec-
ture, in order to develop their own democratic public political culture which would sup-
port the idea of public reasoning. This means that post-Islamist political theorists need to
engage with all types of comprehensive reasoning, in addition to political types of jus-
tification, in order to enrich the public political tradition of their Muslim-majority
society.
III Stability of political liberalism in post-Islamist,
Muslim-majority societies
Modus vivendi and overlapping consensus
The second part of Rawls’ argument for the political conception of justice is to check its
stability. Thus, in this part of our article we consider how the political conception of jus-
tice can be stable in post-Islamist, Muslim-majority societies. In the scenario Rawls pro-
poses in Political Liberalism, stability is developed in two stages. First, it is achieved
simply as a modus vivendi, meaning an agreement in which two parties adopt the prin-
ciple of toleration, in our case democratic constitutionalism, simply for rational and pru-
dential reasons. For Rawls, a significant example of toleration grounded on modus
vivendi is the situation of Roman Catholics and Protestants in Europe immediately after
the Wars of Religion in the 16th and 17th centuries. At the beginning of this article we
mentioned how according to Rawls the Reformation and its aftermath historically paved
the way for political liberalism. As Rawls puts it, ‘religious toleration has historically
first appeared as a modus vivendi between hostile [Roman Catholic and Protestant]
faiths, later becoming a moral principle shared by civilized peoples and recognized by
their leading religions’ (Rawls, 1999a: 113).
From this one might conclude that if the principle of religious toleration be adopted as
a modus vivendi in a post-Islamist society like Iran at the first place, by generations it
may turn into a moral endorsement of toleration via an overlapping consensus. Modus
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vivendi usually comes with constitutional consensus. Constitutional consensus is a con-
sensus reached for prudential reasons on issues such as the procedure formaking and inter-
preting law, processes for selecting persons whose decisions are accepted as authoritative
and other formal procedures. Rawls imagines that under the reasonable and normal con-
ditions, the constitutional consensus gradually evolves into an overlapping consensus.
Overlapping consensus is the most reasonable account of stability for Rawls (Rawls,
1996: 158–68). In contrast to modus vivendi or constitutional consensus, it has a moral
dimension. It occurs when the political conception of justice is embedded, mapped, or
inserted as a module into different doctrines affirmed by citizens. In an overlapping con-
sensus, while we want a political conception to have a justification by reference to Islam
or other comprehensive doctrines, ‘it is neither presented as, nor as derived from, such a
doctrine applied to the basic structure of society’ (ibid.: 12).
In the case of a post-Islamist, Muslim-majority society we come up with the idea of
overlapping consensus as the account of stability when we take pluralism seriously, and
try to answer this question: ‘How is it possible that there exist over time a just and stable
society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable reli-
gious, philosophical and moral doctrines?’ (Rawls, 1996: 4). However, in the strong
reading of political liberalism, overlapping consensus is addressed to ‘societies of a cer-
tain type at a particular historical moment’ (Scheffler, 1994: 18). As advanced democ-
racies, such societies have a strong tradition of democratic thought.
In the moderate reading adopted in this article, overlapping consensus is not too
demanding. Rather, it is conceived as an action-guiding formula of reasonable stability,
part of the ‘realistic utopia’ of a just constitutional democracy. This interpretation of an
overlapping consensus is presented in The Law of Peoples when Rawls says: ‘[P]olitical
philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are ordinarily thought to be the
limits of practicable political possibility, and in doing so reconciles us to our political
and social condition’ (Rawls, 1999a: 11). Thus, we are able to consider overlapping con-
sensus as an ideal theory which exemplifies a well-ordered, post-Islamist, Muslim-
majority society.17 In this interpretation, overlapping consensus shows our aim at
post-Islamist social reform by defining a vision of what is the best we can hope for as
far as the stability of our post-Islamist democracy is concerned.
Although Rawls is optimistic that there are sufficient sociological and psychological
forces to make an overlapping consensus possible in a constitutional democracy (Rawls,
1996: 158), many political theorists are extremely doubtful about the plausibility of a
100 per cent overlapping consensus. For example, Baier claims that it is not clear
whether an overlapping consensus really produces greater stability and social unity than
a constitutional consensus (Baier, 1989: 790). Indeed the results of numerous social sci-
ence studies reveal the pervasive intolerance of citizens in western liberal democracies.
For example, empirical studies in the United States show that significant majorities of
Americans, like the citizens of other liberal societies, do not uphold basic liberties in the
strong sense,18 suggesting that ‘a strong conception of rights does not appear to lie at the
heart of liberal culture’ (Klosko, 1993: 356, 352–3). According to the same research, at
least one third of the American and British citizens are against the free speech rights for
communists, atheists and other disliked groups. These facts contradict the strong reading
of political liberalism, according to which the founding intuitions of political
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constructivism are well entrenched in the public political culture of western societies,
whereas they are absent from the public political culture of post-Islamist ones. Consid-
ering this failure of strong reading on empirical grounds, it would be appropriate to say
that the reasonable conceptions of persons and society are not predominant in the polit-
ical culture of long-standing democracies, the same as they might be not predominant in
a post-Islamist, Muslim society. Still, we may claim that a constitutional consensus is
plausible in both cases.
As a result, the stability of political liberalism in bothwestern and post-Islamist democ-
racies has to be regarded as a mixture of modus vivendi and constitutional consensus. As
far as the public acceptance of liberal democratic values is concerned, the difference
between the public political culture of modern post-Islamist, Muslim-majority countries
and western societies should not be exaggerated. Even in western democracies, some cit-
izens adopt the principles of constitutionalism simply as a modus vivendi. Sherman Jack-
son, an Afro-American Muslim theologian and intellectual, proposes that US Muslims
need to adopt the US constitution simply as a modus vivendi. He argues that US constitu-
tionalism is a product of American custom (urf in Islamic jurisprudence terms) that can be
worked into the Muslim American conception of the shariah in the way that certain cus-
toms of the pre-Islamic Arabic Jahiliyya, such as tribalism and agrarianism, were worked
into Islamic jurisprudence (Jackson [2005: 145–50] quoted in Cornell, 2010).
As noted earlier, we would do better to consider overlapping consensus as a realistic
utopia of a post-Islamic society into which the constitutional consensus will be hopefully
developed at some point. If Rawls’ scenario is correct, over time across generations, the
endorsement of liberal democratic values by Muslim and non-Muslim citizens simply
out of rational (prudential) reasons will develop into a reasonable overlapping consensus,
where those values are respected on their own.
To conclude, a moderate reading of political liberalism, applicable to modern post-
Islamist societies, is plausible. Opposite to the claims of a strong reading of political lib-
eralism, political liberalism as Rawls’ innovative account of political modernity does
offer important theoretical tools which can be used for the enrichment of the post-
Islamist project, and to contribute in the transition to democracy of post-Islamist societ-
ies. Put another way, a deep review in the Rawlsian accounts of justification and stability
proves that, against the claims of strong reading, political liberalism has ‘relevance in
those [post-Islamist] situations where the justification of liberalism matters most’,19 that
is, where liberalism is confronted by non-liberal trends, and reasonable individuals look
for the moral support of political philosophy.20
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Notes
1. See the recent works of Andrew March (2006, 2007, 2009), Mohammad Fadel (2007, 2008,
2012), Mehmet Bilgin (2006, 2007) and Hamid Hadji Haidar (2008).
2. See also Freeman (2007), Maffettone (2010), Kymlicka (2002), Tan (2000), O’Neill (1997),
Habermas (1995), Mulhall and Swift (1996), Wenar (2005) and Cohen (2009).
3. See Hadji Haidar (2008, 2006).
4. For example, in the latter all offices and positions are in principle open to each citizen equally,
while in Kazanistan it is not the case.
5. For example, although a theocracy, the Islamic Republic of Iran is much more compatible with
the centralized model of nation-state in contrast to the pre-modern decentralized model of
Ottomans’ rule. See Atabaki (2009, 2004).
6. According to Dagi (2004) the latest views of Ali Bulac, already an Islamist thinker, are good
evidence for this transformation (see ibid.).
7. To this Rawls sometimes adds a third idea, namely ‘the idea of a well-ordered society’ (see
1996). However, in my understanding, the idea of a well-ordered society is already implicit
in the liberal conceptions of society and person.
8. On Rawls’ ‘Idea of Reasonableness’ and its implications, see also Boettcher (2004), Estlund
(1998), Quong (2004), Wenar (1995), Badamchi (2014).
9. See The Law of Peoples, part II of the ideal theory.
10. See also Schwartzman (2012).
11. This way Rawls is able to answer Stepan’s objection to political liberalism. See Stepan (2000).
12. March, Schwartzman and Ferrara consider reasoning from conjecture an important justifica-
tory force in political liberalism. However, these commentators more or less neglect the
importance of declaration in political liberalism. See March (2009: chs I and II); Schwartzman
(2012); Ferrara (2012).
13. Rawls’ appeal to An-Na‘im’s argument for reconciliation between shariah and constitutional-
ism is an example of conjecture. However, when developed by An-Na‘im himself, the same
argument is an instance of declaration.
14. Another example Rawls provides for a declaration is the Vatican II Council’s Religious Free
dom document (Dignitatis Humanae) through which the Roman Catholic Church declared its
commitment to the principle of religious freedom as found in a constitutional democratic
regime (Rawls, 1997: 796, n.). For the original document, see ‘Dignitatis Humanae: Declaration
on Religious Freedom, On the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Free-
dom’, Pope Paul VI, 7 December 1965, accessible online @: http://www.vatican.va/archive/
hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html,
accessed 8 December 2014.
15. See also Baier (1989: 779).
16. Thus, the liberalisms of Mill or Kant or the communicative action theory of Habermas, if pre-
sented beyond the limits of the political, are examples of both declaration and conjecture.
17. Ideal theory is Rawls’ solution to the problem of ‘characterizing the relationship between phi-
losophical theory and political practice’ (Simmons, 2010: 6). From the beginning in A Theory
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of Justice, Rawls has been primarily occupied with ideal rather than non-ideal theory. In the
first chapter of A Theory of Justice, he declared that his book primarily addressed the ideal
situation: ‘the other limitation on our discussion is that for the most part I examine the prin-
ciples of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society’ (Rawls, 1999b: 7–8). See Sim-
mons (2010); cf. Stemplowska (2008), Wenar (2013[2008]: section on ‘Ideal and Non-ideal
Theory’).
18. Klosko refers to studies by Stouffer, and Branum and Sullivan in the United States and the UK.
Ferrara has almost the same idea about the public political culture of Europe, though he does
not provide as much detail on social science research as Klosko does. See Ferrara (2012).
19. The phrase is taken from Scheffler (1994: 21).
20. This argument is further clarified in Badamchi (2014).
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